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ABSTRACT
In line with the regulation brought in by Solvency II, the Superintendence of Private Insurance (Susep) introduced the 
market risk capital requirement at the end of 2015, with 50% of the minimum capital for this type of risk being required 
by December 31st 2016 and 100% the following year. This regulatory model consists of calculating parametric value at risk 
with a 99% confidence level and a three month time horizon, using the net exposure of expected cash flows from assets and 
liabilities and a covariance matrix updated with market data up to July 2014. One limitation of this regulatory approach 
is that the updating of the covariance matrix depends on prior approval by the National Council of Private Insurance, 
which can limit the frequency the covariance matrix is updated and the model’s adherence to the current market reality. 
As this matrix considers the period before the presidential election, the country’s loss of investment grade status, and the 
impeachment process, which all contributed to an increase in market volatility, this paper analyses the impacts of applying 
the regulatory model, considering the market volatility updated to December 31st 2015, for a special savings company 
(sociedade de capitalização), an insurance company, and an pension fund. Furthermore, the paper discusses the practical 
implications of the new market risk requirement for managing the investments of the entities supervised by Susep, listing 
the various assumptions that can be used in the regulated entities’ Asset and Liability Management decision models and 
possible trade-offs to be addressed in this process.
Keywords: regulatory capital, market risk capital, solvency, pension, open pension fund.
R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 28, n. 75, p. 465-477, set./dez. 2017 465
Impacts of the regulatory model for market risk capital: application in a special savings company, an insurance company, and a pension fund
R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 28, n. 75, p. 465-477, set./dez. 2017466
1. INTRODUCTION
Different stakeholders can have different views with 
regards to the optimal capital structure (proportion 
of own capital and third-party capital) for companies. 
Shareholders, aiming to maximize return and minimize 
risk, tend to prefer the minimum allocation of capital, 
while other stakeholders, such as funders, prefer the 
maximum capital possible, since in the event of possible 
misfortunes over the course of business, the possible loss 
can be mitigated by a company’s own capital. Within 
this setting the following question arises: is the market 
capable of functioning adequately without the State’s 
interference. This is a big question guiding the discussion 
between regulation and self-regulation, with the former 
predicting that government rules should restrict private 
activity in order to maintain market equilibrium, while 
the latter argues that the rules should be set by market 
participants themselves.
Due to the economic, financial, and social relevance of 
the financial and insurance market, the perspective that 
has stood out, although regulation and self-regulation are 
to some extent complementary, is the one that argues that it 
is the State’s job to intervene in the market, by establishing 
standards, however minimum, to guarantee the stability 
of the system and correct possible distortions. The more 
complex the products and services involved, the greater the 
need for State regulation, in order to uphold commitments 
made to the most vulnerable (in other words consumers) 
and maintaining market equilibrium forms part of this.
Along these lines and given the increased complexity of 
financial services and scandals involving big corporations, 
the Basel II Accord emerged (and subsequently Basel III), 
introducing methodologies for calculating minimum 
levels required of capital that are more sensitive to risk, 
allowing a lower capital allocation for institutions that 
use risk management practices better. This tendency for 
the insurance market in European Union countries has 
resulted in Solvency II.
Following the global movement, in Brazil new 
solvency rules for the insurance market have been issued, 
initially establishing those for capital allocation to cover 
subscription, credit, and operational risks.
In December 2014, CNSP Resolution n. 317 was issued 
(Superintendence of Private Insurance [Susep], 2014) 
and subsequently consolidated by CNSP Resolution n. 
321 (Susep, 2015) and altered by CNSP Resolution n. 
343 (Susep, 2016). It introduced criteria for calculating 
risk capital based on market risk for insurers (INSs), 
pension funds (PFs), special saving companies (SSCs), 
and local reinsurers. The regulatory model consists of 
calculating parametric value at risk (VaR), considering 
99% confidence for a three month time horizon. However, 
the covariance matrix established in the rule for calculating 
VaR was updated up to July 2014, prior to the presidential 
election, the country’s loss of investment grade status, 
and the impeachment process, which all contributed to 
an increase in market volatility. Besides this limitation of 
this regulatory approach, in order to update the covariance 
matrix to best reflect the underlying reality, a new 
resolution needs to be approved by the National Council 
of Private Insurance (CNSP), limiting the frequency of 
updates and the adequacy of the covariance matrix to 
the current market reality. Along these lines, given the 
increase in market volatility, the following question arises: 
what is the impact of updating the covariance matrix in 
the VaR calculation for market risk capital purposes?
This article therefore seeks to analyze the results of 
applying the approach defined by CNSP Resolution 
n.321 (Susep, 2015), incorporating market volatility up 
to December 31st 2015, for market risk capital for an SSC, 
an INS, and an PF. Moreover, the paper will discuss the 
practical implications of the new market risk requirement 
for managing the investments of entities supervised by 
the Superintendence of Private Insurance (Susep).
The article is divided into five sections, including this 
introduction. The second section presents the literature 
review, the third presents the methodology used, and 
the fourth constitutes an analysis of the need to adjust 
regulatory capital for the case presented. Finally, the fifth 
section presents the conclusions.
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Capital Requirement
Since the 1980s, financial institution and insurance 
company operations have evolved considerably, 
particularly with the regulations introduced by the Basel 
and Solvency accords. The regulations are structured 
based on the same three pillars:
 ● Pillar I — Quantitative Requirements: calculation 
of solvency capital requirements and minimum 
capital required based on a standard or an internal 
model.
 ● Pillar II — Supervisor review: general principles 
that govern the regulation of risk management 
and internal controls and process reviews. 
 ● Pillar III — Market discipline: guidelines regarding 
the transparency and reporting of information 
related to solvency and financial situation.
These pillars seek to incentivize better practices for 
managing the risks to which INSs, reinsurers, SSCs, 
and PFs are exposed and can be found both in the 
recommendations from the International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS, 2005) and in Solvency 
II of the European Union (Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council [EC], 2009) and in the 
Basel II accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
[BCBS], 2004) for banks.
In Brazil, Susep and CNSP have worked on developing 
the regulatory and supervisory framework based on the 
three pillars instituted in Solvency II.
In Pillar I, the regulation for additional capital for risk 
of insurer and reinsurer damage claims was introduced 
by CNSP resolutions n. 158 (Susep, 2006) and n. 188 
(Susep, 2008), respectively. The criteria for establishing 
the capital for credit risk originated with CNSP Resolution 
n. 228 (Susep, 2010) and the capital for operational risk 
was regulated by CNSP Resolution n. 283 (Susep, 2013).
In 2013, in continuity of the polic•y for implanting 
supervision based on risk, Susep established a technical 
group to present the criteria and methodologies for 
measuring the regulatory risk capital requirement related 
to the market risk of supervised companies. 
According to the presentation from the Susep technical 
group, carried out on April 26th 2013, the market under 
supervision accounted for R$ 549 billion in assets, with R$ 
462 billion in financial assets distributed in the following 
way:
 ● R$ 424 billion for the insurance segment;
 ● R$ 1 billion for the PF segment;
 ● R$ 29 billion for the special savings company 
segment;
 ● R$ 8 billion for the local reinsurer segment.
The relevance of the numbers highlights the economic 
and social importance of these segments in Brazil and 
explains the regulatory body’s concern with defining the 
basic metrics to be observed in order to maintain the 
solvency of the sector.
According to CNSP Resolution n. 317 (Susep, 
2014), consolidated by CNSP Resolution n. 321 (Susep, 
2015), INSs, PFs, SSCs, and local reinsurers will have to 
completely adjust to the new capital regulation for market 
risk by 2017, with the following capital requirement 
chronogram being established:
a. 0% of the capital for market risk by December 
30th 2016;
b. 50% of the capital for market risk between 
December 31st 2016 and December 30th 2017; and 
c. 100% of the capital for market risk by December 
31st 2017
This shows that the subject of this study is contemporary 
and extremely relevant for the companies supervised by 
Susep.
Moreover, given the relevance of this regulation, 
CNSP Resolution n. 343 (Susep, 2016) altered the way 
of calculating adjusted net equity (ANE) to make it more 
sensitive to variations in the market value of assets and 
liabilities and suited to the introduction of the capital 
portion for market risk.
2.2 Asset and Liability Management
The use of the concept of market risk based on the net 
exposure between assets and their respective liabilities 
serves as a factor that incentivizes the use of asset and 
liability management (ALM) practices by the entities 
under Susep supervision.
The basic aim of an entity is to retain enough reserves 
to honor commitments to its participants or clients, 
however the uncertainty component with regards to what 
the assets and liability values will be, and consequently 
the mismatch between these, make the task of managing 
this process a challenge. Within this setting, ALM is a 
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key process for risk management, enabling decisions 
to be taken that are consistent with the behavior of an 
organization’s assets and liabilities, and making it possible 
to monitor and control management variables, such as 
liquidity, solvency, and return, among others. With the 
new market risk capital requirement issued by Susep, this 
variable is added to the scope of the ALM process in the 
supervised entities. 
The ALM models can be divided into two main 
categories: deterministic models and stochastic models. 
The first group includes the cash flow matching models, 
which seek a set of assets with a cash flow equal to that 
of the liabilities, and dedication, which seek assets with 
the closest cash flow possible to that of the liabilities (due 
to the difficulty of finding assets that make cash flow 
matching possible).
The dedication models gave rise to the immunization 
models (Ryan, 2014), whose core idea is to find an asset 
portfolio, at the lowest price possible, whose cash flow is 
greater or equal to that of liabilities. 
The measures used for this purpose are normally 
dollar-duration and convexity; however these measures 
assume parallel shifts in interest rates, which is difficult 
to find in practice. More advanced measures, such as key 
rate duration vectors, have been proposed in the literature 
(Nawalkha, Soto, & Zhang, 2003); however a recent study 
(Carcano & Dall’O, 2011) found evidence that the use of 
more sophisticated models leads to a higher exposure to 
model errors, reducing the quality of the hedge created 
by these approaches.
In the second category, that of stochastic models, 
optimization models are used, considering the possible 
variations in cash flows and asset and liability values, 
which take on a stochastic behavior. The scope of this 
category ranges from the models that consider dynamic 
programming (Cairns, Blake, & Dowd, 2006) to models 
based on risk quantiles, such as VaR (Blake, Cairns, & 
Dowd, 2001).
2.3 Market Risk
Market risk has developed considerably since 1994, 
with JP Morgan bank publishing the RiskMetrics 
methodology (Morgan, 1996), in which the VaR metric 
came to be the reference for calculating market risk both 
in the academic field and in the financial market.
VaR is defined as the highest loss expected for a 
time horizon and a particular confidence interval. VaR 
can be calculated in different ways, according to the 
three methodologies first presented by Risk Metrics: 
Parametric (which assumes that financial returns have 
a known distribution), Historical Simulation (in which 
the quantile established by the VaR is sought in the 
historical distribution of the portfolio returns that are 
being analyzed), and Monte Carlo Simulation (which 
seeks to simulate the behavior of market prices).
Like the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB), which uses VaR 
as a metric for the market risk capital requirement for its 
regulated entities, in the insurance market Susep adopted 
VaR as a metric for calculating the capital requirement 
for market risk.
As established by CNSP Resolution n. 317 (Susep, 
2014), the required capital for market risk will be 
the parametric VaR for three months, with 99% 
confidence. 
The covariance matrix for calculating the parametric 
VaR is estimated using the exponentially weighted 
moving average (EWMA), based on the parameters of 
the term structure of interest rates (TSIR) published 
monthly by the authority itself, and used for the 
liability adequacy test (LAT) calculation, as well as 
the Bovespa Index, dollar, and Brazil Commodities 
Index (BCI) series of returns. The covariance matrix 
adopted in the current resolution refers to July 2014. 
 
3. INTEREST PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY 
This paper aims to analyze the impacts of the new 
market risk capital requirement by evaluating the results 
for an SSC, an INS, and an PF, for December 2015. 
As well as the direct impact of the capital requirement 
on these companies, the possible reflection on the need 
for market risk capital will also be analyzed, where data 
up to December 2015 update the covariance matrix used 
in calculating VaR, given that the current matrix uses 
data up to July 2014.
The covariance matrix will be updated in accordance 
with the methodology established by Susep, which consists 
of applying the EWMA method for the most recent data. 
The updating method is based on the standard EWMA 
formula,
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in which σ is the variance, λ is the decay factor used to 
update the information, and r is the return of the series 
analyzed. For each item in the matrix, the covariance is 
estimated using the following correlation formula:
Table 1 Decay factors
Series of returns Decay factor
Fixed rate 0.92
IGP-M linked rate 0.85
IPCA linked rate 0.94
RR linked rate 0.92
Foreign exchange linked rate 0.73
IGP-M 0.97
IPCA 0.96
RR 0.97
Bovespa Index 0.96
Dolar 0.96
ICB 0.98
IGP-M: Brazilian General Market Price Index; IPCA: Brazilian Consumer Price Index; RR: reference rate.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
converted into:
in which the estimates for volatility σ will be those 
obtained by the EWMA and the correlation ρ used will 
be the historical correlation of the series, considering the 
same period used by Susep to estimate the decay factors. 
The decay factors used will be the same published by Susep 
in the Market Risk Report — Calculation of Factors — 
GT. The factors are presented in Table 1:
It also bears mentioning that the methodology 
established in the calculation of the net exposures between 
assets and liabilities, which are mapped by maturity and 
risk factor in the VaR calculation, does not consider new 
business, but merely the risk already assumed until then by 
the supervised entities (it presupposes run-off companies).
Besides VaR, the analyses will also use marginal VaR, 
which measures how much the VaR would change for a 
monetary unit change in each exposure, and component 
VaR, which measures how much each exposure contributes 
to total VaR (Alexander, 2009; Gourieroux, Laurent, & 
Scaillet, 2000).
Despite the better alternative for reducing the VaR 
defined by the model, and consequently, the required 
capital being the decrease in the net exposure in the risk 
factors via ALM tools, these metrics serve as a parameter 
for evaluating the contributions from each factor to the 
total VaR.
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Table 2 Net exposures by risk factor
Maturity Risk factor SSC (%) INS (%) PF (%)
1 Dollar 0.000 0.000 0.000
21 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
63 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
126 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
252 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
378 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
504 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
630 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
756 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
1008 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
1260 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
2520 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 IGP-M 0.000 4.220 -7.266
63 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 0.409 -0.830
126 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 0.473 -0.997
252 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 0.567 -1.242
378 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 0.505 -1.340
504 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 0.616 -0.479
630 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 0.515 -0.269
756 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 0.451 0.316
1008 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 0.352 1.132
1260 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 0.734 3.067
2520 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 -0.048 3.440
3780 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 0.610 2.819
5040 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 -0.405 1.775
6300 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 -0.321 -0.008
7560 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 -0.161 -0.033
8820 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 -0.076 -0.030
10080 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 -0.036 -0.022
11340 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 -0.016 -0.014
12600 IGP-M linked rate 0.000 -0.011 -0.020
1 IPCA 44.614 8.075 -5.997
63 IPCA linked rate 1.876 0.813 0.068
126 IPCA linked rate 1.008 1.327 0.090
252 IPCA linked rate 2.339 1.610 0.134
378 IPCA linked rate 4.264 1.492 0.125
504 IPCA linked rate 2.380 1.038 0.147
630 IPCA linked rate 1.445 0.834 0.168
756 IPCA linked rate 3.315 1.076 0.220
1008 IPCA linked rate 4.075 0.945 0.290
1260 IPCA linked rate 7.756 0.681 0.699
2520 IPCA linked rate 6.874 -0.665 0.902
3780 IPCA linked rate 2.531 -0.884 0.701
5040 IPCA linked rate 1.926 -0.484 0.609
6300 IPCA linked rate 1.120 -0.204 0.470
7560 IPCA linked rate 1.432 -0.017 0.770
8820 IPCA linked rate 0.561 0.194 0.529
10080 IPCA linked rate 0.076 -0.004 0.076
4. RESULTS
The first stage in the analysis consists of allocating the 
financial flows of the assets and liabilities into the risk 
factors, or fixed maturities, in the net exposure calculation 
for each factor. 
The net exposure data for the three companies are 
presented in Table 2 and are divided by the respective 
total financial assets, in order not to leave the numbers 
of the three companies apparent. 
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Table 2 Cont.
Maturity Risk factor SSC (%) INS (%) PF (%)
11340 IPCA linked rate 0.000 -0.007 0.000
12600 IPCA linked rate 0.000 -0.006 0.000
1 RR -53.272 -0.457 1.767
63 RR Linked rate 4.701 -0.009 -0.342
126 RR Linked rate 3.782 -0.018 -0.419
252 RR Linked rate -0.369 -0.021 -0.426
378 RR Linked rate -9.193 -0.026 -0.261
504 RR Linked rate -8.713 -0.023 -0.107
630 RR Linked rate -7.256 -0.018 -0.049
756 RR Linked rate -9.852 -0.024 -0.032
1008 RR Linked rate -11.622 -0.036 -0.021
1260 RR Linked rate -14.333 -0.091 -0.025
2520 RR Linked rate -2.473 -0.093 -0.037
3780 RR Linked rate -0.005 -0.049 -0.023
5040 RR Linked rate 0.000 -0.024 -0.013
6300 RR Linked rate 0.000 -0.011 -0.007
7560 RR Linked rate 0.000 -0.005 -0.004
8820 RR Linked rate 0.000 -0.002 -0.002
10080 RR Linked rate 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
11340 RR Linked rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
12600 RR Linked rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
21 Fixed rate 0.525 -1.052 -0.007
63 Fixed rate 0.354 -1.070 0.000
126 Fixed rate 0.347 -0.634 0.007
252 Fixed rate 0.453 -0.249 0.174
378 Fixed rate 4.026 0.199 0.009
504 Fixed rate 3.527 0.025 0.098
630 Fixed rate 0.327 -0.139 0.008
756 Fixed rate 0.525 0.029 0.222
1008 Fixed rate -0.026 -0.032 0.039
1260 Fixed rate 0.900 0.066 0.040
2520 Fixed rate 0.150 0.009 0.064
3780 Fixed rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 Stock 0.268 0.164 0.000
1 Commodities 0.000 0.000 0.000
SSC: special savings company; PF: pension fund; INS: insurer; IGP-M: Brazilian General Market Price Index; IPCA: Brazilian 
Consumer Price Index; RR: reference rate.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
For the SSC, apparently the company’s strategy is to 
manage the risk of exposure of liabilities indexed to the 
reference rate (RR) by allocating into assets indexed to 
the Brazilian Consumer Price Index (IPCA).
As for the INS, there is no clear standard, given that 
the positive net exposures are distributed into various 
categories of risk factors, as well as the negative net 
exposures.
With regards to the PF, it appears that in order to 
address the residual liabilities indexed to the RR and to 
the Brazilian General Market Price Index (IGP-M), the 
company allocates into assets indexed to the fixed rate 
and IPCA rates. It bears mentioning that Table 2 presents 
the net exposure of each one of the analyzed companies; 
that is, if the allocation into assets in a particular risk 
factor is greater than the exposure of obligations, it is 
not possible to identify that the company has liabilities 
exposed to that risk factor.
The next step was to calculate the capital requirement 
for the three companies, using the published methodology. 
The capital requirement results, measured in percentage 
of total financial assets, are presented in Table 3.
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Table 3 Capital requirement for market risk
SSC (%) INS (%) PF (%)
VaR 3.25 0.39 2.18
SSC: special savings company; PF: pension fund; INS: insurer; VaR: value at risk.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The VaR is only the starting point for a market risk 
management model, from which it is possible to evaluate 
the possible impacts on the current position of an entity’s 
investments. Using marginal VaR and component VaR, 
the results for the three companies analyzed are in Table 4.
Table 4 Marginal and component value at risk (VaR) 
SSC INS PF
Maturity Risk factor Marginal Component (%) Marginal Component (%) Marginal Component (%)
1 Dollar 0.000 0.00 0.005 0.00 0.000 0.00
21 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
63 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
126 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00
252 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.001 0.00
378 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.001 0.00
504 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.001 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.002 0.00
630 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.001 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.003 0.00
756 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.002 0.00 (0.000) 0.00 0.004 0.00
1008 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.003 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 0.006 0.00
1260 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.005 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 0.004 0.00
2520 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.008 0.00 0.000 0.00 (0.003) 0.12
1 IGP-M 0.079 0.00 (0.028) -26.24 0.126 -42.16
63 IGP-M Linked rate (0.002) 0.00 0.012 1.10 (0.001) 0.05
126 IGP-M Linked rate (0.002) 0.00 0.016 1.68 0.008 -0.45
252 IGP-M Linked rate 0.002 0.00 0.017 2.12 0.019 -1.18
378 IGP-M Linked rate 0.010 0.00 0.014 1.54 0.030 -0.66
504 IGP-M Linked rate 0.017 0.00 0.010 1.38 0.039 -0.48
630 IGP-M Linked rate 0.023 0.00 0.007 0.82 0.047 0.68
756 IGP-M Linked rate 0.028 0.00 0.005 0.51 0.060 3.11
1008 IGP-M Linked rate 0.036 0.00 0.002 0.15 0.072 10.21
1260 IGP-M Linked rate 0.043 0.00 (0.001) -0.20 0.154 24.34
2520 IGP-M Linked rate 0.087 0.00 (0.032) 0.33 0.231 29.99
3780 IGP-M Linked rate 0.130 0.00 (0.072) -9.57 0.301 24.53
5040 IGP-M Linked rate 0.171 0.00 (0.109) 9.67 0.365 -0.13
6300 IGP-M Linked rate 0.209 0.00 (0.143) 10.06 0.426 -0.64
7560 IGP-M Linked rate 0.245 0.00 (0.176) 6.22 0.485 -0.67
8820 IGP-M Linked rate 0.281 0.00 (0.207) 3.43 0.543 -0.55
10080 IGP-M Linked rate 0.316 0.00 (0.238) 1.86 0.601 -0.39
11340 IGP-M Linked rate 0.351 0.00 (0.268) 0.96 0.659 -0.61
12600 IGP-M Linked rate 0.386 0.00 (0.298) 0.72 0.003 0.01
1 IPCA 0.006 8.05 0.033 58.99 0.004 -1.16
63 IPCA Linked rate 0.004 0.24 0.004 0.70 0.002 0.01
126 IPCA Linked rate 0.002 0.07 0.004 1.15 0.010 0.06
252 IPCA Linked rate 0.008 0.55 0.006 1.97 0.022 0.13
378 IPCA Linked rate 0.017 2.19 0.005 1.51 0.034 0.23
504 IPCA Linked rate 0.025 1.85 0.002 0.44 0.043 0.33
630 IPCA Linked rate 0.032 1.43 (0.001) -0.20 0.053 0.53
756 IPCA Linked rate 0.040 4.03 (0.004) -0.97 0.069 0.92
1008 IPCA Linked rate 0.052 6.49 (0.010) -2.01 0.081 2.62
1260 IPCA Linked rate 0.062 14.79 (0.015) -2.22 0.140 5.81
2520 IPCA Linked rate 0.109 23.09 (0.045) 6.51 0.193 6.21
3780 IPCA Linked rate 0.154 12.00 (0.076) 14.81 0.246 6.90
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Table 4 Cont.
SSC INS PF
Maturity Risk factor Marginal Component (%) Marginal Component (%) Marginal Component (%)
5040 IPCA Linked rate 0.205 12.12 (0.104) 11.00 0.297 6.41
6300 IPCA Linked rate 0.256 8.81 (0.122) 5.46 0.370 13.10
7560 IPCA Linked rate 0.326 14.35 (0.143) 0.52 0.432 10.51
8820 IPCA Linked rate 0.385 6.64 (0.155) -6.58 0.479 1.67
10080 IPCA Linked rate 0.426 0.99 (0.160) 0.15 0.522 0.00
11340 IPCA Linked rate 0.460 0.00 (0.165) 0.25 0.563 0.00
12600 IPCA Linked rate 0.488 0.00 (0.170) 0.23 0.001 -0.02
1 RR 0.000 -0.09 (0.000) 0.02 0.000 0.02
63 RR Linked rate 0.000 0.07 0.000 0.00 0.003 -0.06
126 RR Linked rate 0.001 0.14 0.000 0.00 0.007 -0.13
252 RR Linked rate 0.003 -0.03 (0.000) 0.00 0.010 -0.12
378 RR Linked rate 0.005 -1.36 (0.001) 0.01 0.014 -0.07
504 RR Linked rate 0.007 -1.77 (0.002) 0.01 0.018 -0.04
630 RR Linked rate 0.009 -1.94 (0.004) 0.02 0.022 -0.03
756 RR Linked rate 0.011 -3.28 (0.005) 0.03 0.030 -0.03
1008 RR Linked rate 0.015 -5.40 (0.009) 0.07 0.037 -0.04
1260 RR Linked rate 0.018 -8.13 (0.011) 0.23 0.078 -0.13
2520 RR Linked rate 0.040 -3.07 (0.027) 0.55 0.116 -0.12
3780 RR Linked rate 0.061 -0.01 (0.040) 0.44 0.153 -0.09
5040 RR Linked rate 0.081 0.00 (0.053) 0.28 0.190 -0.06
6300 RR Linked rate 0.101 0.00 (0.065) 0.16 0.226 -0.04
7560 RR Linked rate 0.120 0.00 (0.077) 0.09 0.262 -0.02
8820 RR Linked rate 0.140 0.00 (0.089) 0.04 0.299 -0.01
10080 RR Linked rate 0.159 0.00 (0.101) 0.02 0.335 0.00
11340 RR Linked rate 0.179 0.00 (0.113) 0.01 0.371 0.00
12600 RR Linked rate 0.198 0.00 (0.125) 0.00 (0.006) 0.00
21 Fixed rate 0.000 0.00 (0.000) 0.00 0.000 0.00
63 Fixed rate 0.001 0.01 0.000 0.00 0.002 0.00
126 Fixed rate 0.003 0.03 (0.000) 0.01 0.004 0.00
252 Fixed rate 0.008 0.11 (0.001) 0.07 0.013 0.11
378 Fixed rate 0.015 1.84 (0.004) -0.19 0.023 0.01
504 Fixed rate 0.022 2.35 (0.008) -0.04 0.034 0.15
630 Fixed rate 0.028 0.29 (0.012) 0.37 0.044 0.02
756 Fixed rate 0.035 0.57 (0.017) -0.10 0.054 0.55
1008 Fixed rate 0.047 -0.04 (0.024) 0.17 0.073 0.13
1260 Fixed rate 0.057 1.59 (0.031) -0.45 0.090 0.17
2520 Fixed rate 0.099 0.46 (0.063) -0.13 0.157 0.46
3780 Fixed rate 0.131 0.00 (0.093) 0.00 0.210 0.00
1 Stock 0.001 0.01 0.002 0.06 (0.001) 0.00
1 Commodities (0.059) 0.00 0.019 0.00 (0.068) 0.00
SSC: special savings company; PF: pension fund; INS: insurer; IGP-M: Brazilian General Market Price Index; IPCA: Brazilian 
Consumer Price Index; RR: reference rate.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
For the SSC, the maturities linked to the IPCA, despite 
not being the ones with the highest marginal VaR, are the 
ones that contributed most to the entity’s total VaR. In 
the case of the INS, the maturity with the greatest weight 
in the total VaR is that of the IPCA rate, while for the 
pension fund it is the maturities linked to the IGP-M.
These results were obtained considering the covariance 
matrix with a July 2014 base date, adopted in CNSP 
Resolution n. 321 (Susep, 2015); however, the market 
changes over time, presenting periods of higher and lower 
volatility for the various risk factors considered. In order to 
maintain adherence to the market reality, the information 
in the covariance matrix should be updated, reflecting 
the supervised entities’ real solvency risk.
Thus, this paper sought to estimate the impact of a 
possible updating of the covariance matrix with the data up 
to December 2015, considering the TSIR curves available 
from the Susep website (Susep, 2015), and contemplating 
the volatility in the economic scenario occurring during 
the electoral period of 2014 and Brazil’s loss of investment 
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Table 5 Required capital with updating of the assumptions
SSC (%) INS (%) PF (%)
VaR 6.37 0.43 2.34
SSC: special savings company; PF: pension fund; INS: insurer; VaR: value at risk.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 6 Increase in required capital with update
SSC (%) INS (%) PF (%)
VaR 95.70  9.67 7.81
SSC: special savings company; PF: pension fund; INS: insurer; VaR: value at risk.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The marginal VaR and the component VaR for the three companies are presented in Table 7.
Table 7 Marginal and component value at risk (VaR) with new matrix
SSC INS PF
Maturity Risk factor Marginal Component (%) Marginal Component (%) Marginal Component (%)
1 Dollar 0.007 0.00 0.064 0.00 (0.078) 0.00
21 Foreign exchange linked rate (0.000) 0.00 (0.000) 0.00 (0.000) 0.00
63 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.00 (0.000) 0.00 0.000 0.00
126 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.002 0.00 (0.003) 0.00 0.003 0.00
252 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.001 0.00 (0.005) 0.00 0.007 0.00
378 Foreign exchange linked rate 0.000 0.00 (0.005) 0.00 0.009 0.00
504 Foreign exchange linked rate (0.001) 0.00 (0.007) 0.00 0.011 0.00
630 Foreign exchange linked rate (0.001) 0.00 (0.009) 0.00 0.013 0.00
756 Foreign exchange linked rate (0.001) 0.00 (0.011) 0.00 0.014 0.00
1008 Foreign exchange linked rate (0.001) 0.00 (0.015) 0.00 0.018 0.00
1260 Foreign exchange linked rate (0.001) 0.00 (0.018) 0.00 0.020 0.00
2520 Foreign exchange linked rate (0.002) 0.00 (0.005) 0.00 0.015 0.00
1 IGP-M 0.003 0.00 0.001 0.91 0.002 -0.66
63 IGP-M Linked rate 0.000 0.00 0.005 0.48 (0.001) 0.04
126 IGP-M Linked rate 0.001 0.00 0.007 0.72 0.001 -0.03
252 IGP-M Linked rate 0.001 0.00 0.008 1.04 0.006 -0.30
378 IGP-M Linked rate 0.002 0.00 0.006 0.66 0.009 -0.53
504 IGP-M Linked rate 0.004 0.00 0.003 0.46 0.013 -0.27
630 IGP-M Linked rate 0.005 0.00 0.001 0.08 0.018 -0.21
756 IGP-M Linked rate 0.007 0.00 (0.002) -0.24 0.024 0.32
1008 IGP-M Linked rate 0.010 0.00 (0.009) -0.74 0.036 1.75
1260 IGP-M Linked rate 0.013 0.00 (0.016) -2.78 0.048 6.32
2520 IGP-M Linked rate 0.022 0.00 (0.052) 0.57 0.102 14.96
3780 IGP-M Linked rate 0.030 0.00 (0.089) -12.69 0.153 18.41
5040 IGP-M Linked rate 0.041 0.00 (0.139) 13.18 0.220 16.63
6300 IGP-M Linked rate 0.055 0.00 (0.203) 15.18 0.302 -0.10
7560 IGP-M Linked rate 0.070 0.00 (0.274) 10.31 0.392 -0.55
8820 IGP-M Linked rate 0.085 0.00 (0.348) 6.15 0.484 -0.62
grade status. This updating tends to better reflect the 
current scenario, and consequently, better estimate the 
market risk incurred by the market participants. 
With the updating of the covariance matrix, an 
increase is observed for the market risk capital of the 
three companies, due to the increase in volatility for 
the period, with the impact being more accentuated in 
the SSC, whose need for capital doubles. The results are 
presented in Table 5.
The SSC has an expressive increase in required capital with the change in the covariance matrix used. The increase 
in capital is presented in Table 6.
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Table 7 Cont.
SSC INS PF
Maturity Risk factor Marginal Component (%) Marginal Component (%) Marginal Component (%)
10080 IGP-M Linked rate 0.101 0.00 (0.423) 3.53 0.576 -0.54
11340 IGP-M Linked rate 0.116 0.00 (0.498) 1.91 0.668 -0.40
12600 IGP-M Linked rate 0.131 0.00 (0.574) 1.49 0.760 -0.65
1 IPCA 0.002 1.28 0.003 5.78 (0.001) 0.13
63 IPCA Linked rate 0.001 0.02 0.003 0.66 0.002 0.00
126 IPCA Linked rate 0.001 0.02 0.007 2.16 0.003 0.01
252 IPCA Linked rate 0.003 0.13 0.007 2.71 0.007 0.04
378 IPCA Linked rate 0.007 0.44 0.006 2.11 0.014 0.07
504 IPCA Linked rate 0.010 0.36 0.003 0.80 0.022 0.14
630 IPCA Linked rate 0.013 0.28 (0.000) -0.07 0.029 0.21
756 IPCA Linked rate 0.015 0.76 (0.004) -1.06 0.034 0.32
1008 IPCA Linked rate 0.018 1.15 (0.012) -2.61 0.044 0.54
1260 IPCA Linked rate 0.020 2.49 (0.019) -3.09 0.053 1.57
2520 IPCA Linked rate 0.032 3.48 (0.061) 9.48 0.100 3.84
3780 IPCA Linked rate 0.048 1.90 (0.107) 22.18 0.158 4.71
5040 IPCA Linked rate 0.066 1.98 (0.154) 17.36 0.218 5.66
6300 IPCA Linked rate 0.084 1.48 (0.198) 9.44 0.278 5.57
7560 IPCA Linked rate 0.103 2.32 (0.241) 0.94 0.337 11.08
8820 IPCA Linked rate 0.122 1.08 (0.282) -12.76 0.396 8.93
10080 IPCA Linked rate 0.142 0.17 (0.321) 0.31 0.454 1.47
11340 IPCA Linked rate 0.163 0.00 (0.359) 0.59 0.511 0.00
12600 IPCA Linked rate 0.183 0.00 (0.395) 0.57 0.567 0.00
1 RR (0.094) 78.53 (0.033) 3.52 0.023 1.76
63 RR Linked rate (0.000) -0.02 (0.000) 0.00 0.001 -0.01
126 RR Linked rate (0.000) -0.03 (0.000) 0.00 0.002 -0.03
252 RR Linked rate (0.000) 0.00 (0.001) 0.01 0.004 -0.08
378 RR Linked rate (0.000) 0.06 (0.002) 0.01 0.007 -0.08
504 RR Linked rate (0.000) 0.07 (0.004) 0.02 0.010 -0.05
630 RR Linked rate (0.001) 0.07 (0.006) 0.03 0.014 -0.03
756 RR Linked rate (0.001) 0.13 (0.009) 0.05 0.018 -0.02
1008 RR Linked rate (0.001) 0.25 (0.015) 0.12 0.025 -0.02
1260 RR Linked rate (0.002) 0.41 (0.021) 0.44 0.033 -0.03
2520 RR Linked rate (0.002) 0.09 (0.048) 1.03 0.067 -0.10
3780 RR Linked rate (0.001) 0.00 (0.071) 0.81 0.102 -0.10
5040 RR Linked rate 0.000 0.00 (0.094) 0.53 0.139 -0.08
6300 RR Linked rate 0.002 0.00 (0.118) 0.30 0.177 -0.06
7560 RR Linked rate 0.004 0.00 (0.143) 0.17 0.216 -0.03
8820 RR Linked rate 0.006 0.00 (0.168) 0.09 0.255 -0.02
10080 RR Linked rate 0.008 0.00 (0.193) 0.04 0.293 -0.01
11340 RR Linked rate 0.010 0.00 (0.219) 0.02 0.331 0.00
12600 RR Linked rate 0.012 0.00 (0.244) 0.01 0.368 0.00
21 Fixed rate (0.000) 0.00 (0.000) 0.01 0.000 0.00
63 Fixed rate 0.000 0.00 (0.000) 0.04 0.001 0.00
126 Fixed rate 0.001 0.00 (0.000) 0.06 0.003 0.00
252 Fixed rate 0.002 0.02 (0.002) 0.12 0.008 0.06
378 Fixed rate 0.005 0.30 (0.005) -0.25 0.015 0.01
504 Fixed rate 0.007 0.37 (0.010) -0.06 0.022 0.09
630 Fixed rate 0.008 0.04 (0.016) 0.53 0.030 0.01
756 Fixed rate 0.010 0.08 (0.023) -0.15 0.039 0.37
1008 Fixed rate 0.012 0.00 (0.036) 0.27 0.055 0.09
1260 Fixed rate 0.014 0.20 (0.049) -0.75 0.071 0.12
2520 Fixed rate 0.025 0.06 (0.105) -0.23 0.142 0.39
3780 Fixed rate 0.036 0.00 (0.157) 0.00 0.214 0.00
1 Stock 0.010 0.04 (0.066) -2.52 0.108 0.00
1 Commodities (0.151) 0.00 (0.097) 0.00 (0.370) 0.00
SSC: special savings company; PF: pension fund; INS: insurer; IGP-M: Brazilian General Market Price Index; IPCA: Brazilian 
Consumer Price Index; RR: reference rate.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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With the change in the covariance matrix used, not only 
the capital requirement changes, but also the evaluation 
regarding which strategies to use to manage each entity’s 
VaR.
For the SSC, the main factor contributing to the VaR 
is the RR, while in the calculation with the matrix up to 
July 2014 it was the IPCA maturities.
In the case of the INS, the greatest contribution to 
the VaR changes from the IPCA rate to the intermediate 
IPCA maturities, with the new matrix. As for the PF, the 
VaR results indicate the intermediate IGP-M maturities 
as the greatest contribution to VaR with both matrices.
Given the regulatory model adopted, Susep’s concern 
is observed in relation to the risk of decay of risk factors 
and periods between assets and liabilities, given that 
the VaR calculation is applied to net exposures, which 
highlights the importance of ALM practices. Currently, 
market risk management in many of the supervised 
entities is geared towards evaluating and monitoring the 
variation in the value of financial investments in isolation, 
without observing the behavior of the respective liabilities. 
Therefore, conservative practices for market risk adopting 
the restricted perspective of financial assets (for example, 
concentrating portfolio investments into low volatility 
government bonds, such as Financial Treasury Bills) may 
not be the ones that result in the lowest capital allocation, 
which represents a new challenge for the risk managers 
of these companies.  
It is worth mentioning, however, that the investment 
aims of the regulated entities can go beyond simply 
reducing required capital. It is common to find, for 
example, investment strategies that aim, via allocation into 
assets indexed to the IPCA, to address liabilities indexed 
to the RR, seeking the potential financial gains to the 
detriment of the need for market risk capital. Moreover, 
ALM practices often consider the assumption of new 
business instead of a run-off company, despite this being 
a concept embedded into the regulatory model.
All of these challenges make the current need to use 
the ALM apparent in order to address the different aims 
encountered, whether these are required by the regulator, 
or are derived from market operations.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The introduction of market risk capital regulations for 
INSs, PFs, SSCs, and reinsurers leads to various challenges 
for the market, not only from a financial impact perspective, 
but also for aspects of management and regulation.
The results presented in the cases studied in this paper 
show that there is an impact for the entities and that this 
impact can lead to large variations, depending on the 
assumptions used. 
The covariance matrix used for the purposes of 
calculating the regulatory capital for market risk was 
updated only up to July 2014 and did not capture the effect 
of the volatility of the current Brazilian market, which may 
be underestimating risk, as shown in this paper’s result, 
given that this date precedes the electoral period and the 
loss of investment grade status, which are, for example, 
events that contributed to an increase in volatility.
The financial impact of the introduction of market 
risk capital tends to incentivize changes in management 
practices, especially in relation to the ALM, remembering 
that asset and liability management is a much broader 
concept that merely pairing assets and liabilities. There 
is a need to understand and define the aim of the ALM, 
such as: (i) to optimize regulatory capital, (ii) to optimize 
economic capital, and (iii) to optimize financial return, 
observing a capital budget etc. The establishment of an 
ALM practice was also included in the rule that addresses 
enterprise risk management (ERM), published in Susep 
Circular Letter n. 517 (Susep, 2015), and altered by Susep 
Circular Letter n. 521 (Susep, 2015).
The rule for market risk capital also tends to influence 
the way companies engage in market risk management, 
which usually only emphasizes financial assets, coming to 
incorporate a more holistic view of risk and simultaneously 
analyzing assets and liabilities. This should even influence 
the organizational structures of companies, requiring 
more interaction between investment and actuarial areas.
Therefore, given the relevance of the topic that is the 
object of this research and its consequences, the need for 
more research into this is observed. 
For future studies, we suggest developing other 
conceptual studies, such as:
 ●  The solvency time horizon is different for each 
type of risk; therefore, what is the concept of the 
aggregated view for regulatory capital?
 ●  Is there interest rate risk overlapping between the 
market risk capital model and the subscription 
risk one for PFs?
 ● When will the internal model be regulated?
Moreover, we recommend that future studies explore 
another topic that relates to this research, regarding the 
measurement of liabilities broken down into “current 
estimates” and “margin over the current estimates” (MOCE). 
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